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constitutional interpretation. The doctrine of immunity of in-
strumentalities was characterized as one of political exigency
and expedience and not proper for judicial consideration. Ad-
mittedly, significant particular differences between the constitu-
tional and judicial systems of Canada, Australia, and the United
States exist;59 nevertheless, they are sufficiently alike to make
comparison worthwhile60 In all three, the implied immunity
doctrine was adopted and, after a rather uneasy existence, was
then abolished. This process, which in Australia required but
sixteen years,61 took thirty in Canada,62 and nearly seventy in
the United States."
On the principle, heretofore mentioned,' that summary repu-
diation of a poorly conceived or formulated judicial doctrine is
preferable to a policy of lingering attrition, the Australian and
Canadian record in this connection is better than the American.
It is to be hoped that we will not in other respects disregard the
available constitutional experience of those federations and delay
correction of our errors.
CARROLL J. DONOHUE.
THE NEGATIVE ORDER DOCTRINE: ROCHESTER TELEPHONE
CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES
On April 17, 1939, the "negative order doctrine"1 was un-
expectedly overruled by the Supreme Court, through Justice
Frankfurter, after a concise review of its scope, effects, and
value. In Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States,2 the Fed-
eral Communications Commission adjudged a telephone company
in Rochester, N. Y. under the "control" of the New York Tele-
59. Webb v. Outtrim [1907] A. C. 81.
60. Higgins, McCulloch v. Maryland in Australia (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev.
559; Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and Australian Federal Con-
stitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345; Kennedy, Essays in Constitu-
tional Law (1934) 109, 115; concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Graves v. New York (1939) 59 S. Ct. 595, 603. This is illustrated
in Abel, Price Control by Government Competition in Anglo-American Fed-
erations (1938) 23 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 459.
61. 1904 to 1920.
62. 1878 to 1908.
63. 1871 to 1939.
64. See supra, note 13.
1. For general discussion see Note (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 766; Note (1939)
6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 277; Note (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 908; 2 Sharfman, The
Interstate Commerce Commission (1931) 406-417; McGuire, Judicial Re-
views of Administrative Decisions (1938) 26 Geo. L. J. 574; Rosenberry,
Power of the Courts to Set Aside Administrative Rules and Orders (1938)
24 A. B. A. J. 279; Comment (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 522.
2. (1939) 59 S. Ct. 754.
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phone Co. and therefore subject to all common carrier provisions
of the Federal Communications Act and to the Commission's
orders pursuant thereto. On appeal, after a rehearing was re-
fused, the jurisdiction of the District Court was challenged for
the first time in the Supreme Court, the government urging that
the order was not reviewable because it was a negative order,
i. e., one not enforceable and merely determinative of status
under the Act. The Supreme Court unconditionally rejected the
negative order doctrine in favor of other more realistic criteria
of reviewabiity, but affirmed th6 lower courts' dismissal of the
petition on the merits.
In 1912, in Proctor and Gamble Co. v. United States,3 an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission denying an injunction
against demurrage charges by carriers was held nonreviewable
because negative. This decision gave rise to the negative order
doctrine, which has been freely applied, at first only to orders
of the Interstate Commerce Commission and other agencies'
whose decisions were reviewable in the manner provided by the
Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913,5 but in recent years to other
agencies.6 Evolved largely for protecting the Interstate Com-
merce Act's policy of achieving uniformity of rates through de-
liberation of experts, it was later extended to a heterogeneity of
situations lacking a common basis.
3. 225 U. S. 282.
4. Inghram v. Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha (D. C. D. Neb. 1933)
5 F. Supp. 486; Packers and Stockyards Act (1921) 42 Stat. 159, (1927)
7 U. S. C. A. secs. 181, 217.
5. (1913) 38 Stat. 219, (1927) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 41 (27). United States
v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 226, contained dictum that the negative order
doctrine operates only under the special review procedure of the Urgent
Deficiencies Act; this dictum was not followed. See Watkins, Has a Shipper
Who Has Been Denied Relief by the Interstate Commerce Commission Any
Remedy? (1917) 17 Col. L. Rev. 34. The Urgent Deficiencies Act repealed
the Commerce Court Act (1910) 36 Stat. 539, (1911) 36 Stat. 1146, (1927)
28 U. S. C. A. sees. 41 (27), 41 (28), and transferred the jurisdiction of
the latter to the United States District Courts. The Commerce Court Act
transferred the jurisdiction given by the Hepburn-Act (1906) 34 Stat. 584,(1929) 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 1(1-9), to the Circuit Courts, to the Commerce
Court.
6. Federal Power Act: Newport Electric Corp. v. Federal Power Comm.
(C. C. A. 2, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 580; Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Federal
Power Comm. (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 835; Carolina Aluminum Co.
v. Federal Power Comm. (C. C. A. 4, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 435; cf. Federal
Power Comm. v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1938) 304 U. S. 375; Houston
Natural Gas Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Comm. (C. C. A. 4, 1938)
100 F. (2d) 5; cf. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm. (1936) 298 U. S.
1, aff'g (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 617, and American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Comm. (App. D. C. 1937) 93 F. (2d)
236. See American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States (D. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 121, 126.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss4/13
Taking a very broad view of the scope of the negative order
doctrine, Mr. Justice Frankfurter designated three categories
into which the prior cases may be grouped.7 In the first, the
action sought to be reviewed merely constituted the basis for
future application of the laws: e. g., preliminary property valu-
ation of rail carriers;" reopening proceedings to value property;9
refusal to re-examine railroad rates for carrying mail ;1o deter-
mination of a railroad's status as outside the exemption from
the Railway Labor Act;- assignment of a cause for further hear-
ing ;12 and refusal by the Securities Commission to permit with-
drawal of a registration statement.'3 In the second category, the
review sought was of action which declined to relieve the com-
plainant from a statutory command forbidding or compelling
certain conduct," such as a finding that, in violation of the
Panama Canal Act,25 a common carrier by water was in com-
petition with the railroad that owned it;28 a finding that certain
railroad tracks were part of a general system of transportation
so as to necessitate procuring a certificate of public necessity and
convenience;' a denial by the Interstate Commerce Commission
of permission to depart from the long and short haul clause;',
and a determination that a consolidation of public utilities was
inconsistent with public interest. 9 The third category covered
situations wherein review was sought of a refusal to enter an
order directed to a third person,20 as in case of a shipper's
7. (1939) 59 S. Ct. 754, 756.
8. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R. (1927) 273 U. S. 299;
Delaware and Hudson Co. v. United States (1925) 266 U. S. 438.
9. New York, 0. &. W. Ry. v. United States (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1926)
14 F. (2d) 850.
10. United States v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 226.
11. Shannahan v. United States (1938) 303 U. S. 596; Carolina Alumi-
num Co. v. Federal Power Comm. (C. C. A. 4, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 435; cf.
Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. R. (1938) 305 U. S. 177.
12. United States v. Illinois Central R. R. (1917) 244 U. S. 82; ef.
Federal Power Comm. v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1938) 304 U. S. 375,
where the same type of order was held affirmative in substance because
it commanded definite action and was followed by penalties.
13. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm. (1936) 298 U. S. 1, aff'g
(C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 617.
14. See discussion in Note (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 908, 913.
15. (1912) 37 Stat. 560, (1929) 49 U. S. C. A. see. 5.
16. Lehigh Valley R. R. v. United States (1917) 243 U. S. 412.
17. Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United States (1930) 280 U. S. 469.
18. Cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States (1914) 234 U. S. 476.
19. Newport Electric Corp. v. Federal Power Comm. (C. C. A. 2, 1938)
97 F. (2d) 580; cf. Pacific Power and Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm.(C. C. A. 9, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 835.
20. Here looms the bitter controversy between shippers and carriers:
if shippers prevail and affirmative orders are issued, carriers are safe-
guarded through judicial review; if carriers prevail and affirmative relief
1939] NOTES
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petition for change in rates,21 recovery of overcharges, 22 or relief
from charges for reweighing live stock.2 3 In all of these situa-
tions the courts have refused to review orders of the respective
commissions on the ground that they were "negative". These
refusals were made without investigating whether abuse of
discretion, lack of jurisdiction, mistake of law, or denial of due
process were present.
The uncertain base of the negative order rule was reflected
in judicial attempts to determine when particular orders con-
stituted a negative variety. Review of some orders has been
permitted on the ground that, although technically negative,
in substance they were affirmative. In the Intermountain Rate
cases,2' the order was held affirmative since it refused that
which the statute affirmatively declared should be granted if
the specified conditions were found to exist. In Pacific Power
and Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission,25 disapproval of
the proposed transfer of assets of one public utility to another
was held affirmative in the sense that every petition seeks en-
forcement of a right, the denial of which raises a justiciable issue.
In United States v. New River Co., 26 the dismissal of a complaint
was held affirmative because it altered the status quo in making
an old rule reapply. In Alton R. R. v. United States,2 a refusal
to establish new divisions of reshipping rates was termed a
"permissive" order. Powell v. United States21 held an order
was affirmative because it struck from the files a tariff of rates.
And in Chicago Junction R. R. v. United States,29 it was held
that orders granting privileges might be enjoined or set aside
even though they needed no enforcement.'
The reasons which have been advanced to uphold the doc-
trine no longer apply, if they ever did.$' The first ground, ap-
is denied, shippers have no recourse. See 2 Sharfman, op. cit. supra, note 1,
at 416; Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1928)
170.
2L Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States (1912) 225 U. S. 282.
•22. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1931) 283 U. S. 235; Southern
Transportation Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm. (App. D. C. 1931) 47 F.(2d) 411, cert. denied (1933) 289 U. S. 755.
23. Inghram v. Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha (D. C. D. Neb. 1933)
5 F. Supp. 486.
24. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States (1914) 234 U. S. 476.
25. (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 835.
26. (1924) 265 U. S. 533.
27. (1932) 287 U. S. 229.
28. (1937) 300 U. S. 276.
29. (1924) 264 U. S. 258.
30. See Note (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 908, 909; and Note (1938) 47
Yale L. J. 766.
31. See Note (1939) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 277, 280.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss4/13
NOTES
pearing in the Proctor and Gamble case, was that the review
section of the Commerce Court Act,8 2 mentioning first the en-
forcement and then the enjoining of orders, indicated that the
"orders" which the Court had jurisdiction to enjoin were the
same as those which it had power to enforce. Hence, any order
that did not need to be "enforced" was not reviewable and was
dubbed "negative." 3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated that
this technical ground had been overruled by later cases.3' Even
so, a second and main consideration in the Proctor and Gamble
case was a desire to avoid frustrating the policy of the Act by
usurping the expert determination of technical problems. 5 But
this is no adequate basis; for, as will be shown, there are other
and better means for protecting the function of the administra-
tive agency. A third ground, advanced in United States v.
Griffin,8 6 was that negative orders, being refusals to change the
status quo, are comparatively unimportant and should not re-
ceive the exceptional type of review afforded uider the Com-
merce Court Act in conjunction with the Urgent Deficiencies
Act."t This is sufficiently answered by an indication of some
of the practical problems involved. Recognition that an order
of a commission dismissing a complaint, and thus maintaining
the status quo, is an exercise of administrative functions fully
as much as an order directing some change in status, 8 calls for
the equal reviewability granted to orders of the latter kind.
With respect to negative orders of the declaratory judgment
type, it has been urged that they do not settle the issues and
that review should come at a later stage. This ground, while
true, is adequately provided for by the "final order" doctrine,
which defines the stages at which administrative action can
be challenged, and denies appeal from interim and interlocutory
orders. Another ground, suggested as the real reason behind
the negative order doctrine, was that it restricted appealability
because of the desire of the courts to curtail the burden of re-
view. This can be taken care of by amplification of the final
order doctrine, permitting appeal only from the latter steps of
32. (1911) 36 Stat. 1148, (1927) 28 U. S. C. A. secs. 41(27), 41(28).
33. Note (1988) 47 Yale L. J. 766, 786, says that this juxtaposition had
at most a "purposive plausibility."
84. (1939) 59 S. Ct. 754, 760.
35. Accord, Board of Railroad Comm'rs v. Great Northern Ry. (1930)
281 U. S. 412. See Note (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 766, 786; Sharfman, op. cit.
supra, note 1, at 406.
36. (1938) 308 U. S. 226.
37. Note (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 766, 787.
38. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States (1939) 59 S. Ct. 754,
760.
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an administrative proceeding. Indication that the exceptions to
this doctrine were being limited even before the Rochester Tele-
phone Corp. case, is found in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp.," in which it was held no injunction would be granted to
an interlocutory order on an allegation that the mere holding
of a hearing would work irreparable damage. 0
In short, there is no adequate justification for the doctrine
of negative orders with its nebulous content.'1 No clear test had
been devised by which orders of administrative bodies could be
classified into negative or affirmative, and therefore review was
rendered arbitrary and uncertain. One result thereof was un-
warranted differentiation between competing groups.42 "Nega-
tive," says Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "has really been an obfus-
cating adjective in that it implies a search for a distinction-
non-action as against action-which does not involve the real
considerations on which rest the reviewability of Commission
orders within the framework of its discretionary authority and
within the general criteria of justiciability."4
In its place, Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests two other tests
to satisfy the policy considerations for which the doctrine was
evolved. First is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which
safeguards the discretion and power of the administrative body."
As held in the so-called Abilene case," exclusive primary juris-
diction was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission to
make its determination concerning alleged unreasonableness of
a charge before resort is allowed to courts for recovery of dam-
ages. Later the doctrine was applied to numerous other aspects
of the regulatory process. 6 Its purpose is to secure that uni-
formity of policy which can be gained only through scientific
analysis by a body of experts when the inquiry is one of fact
and discretion in technical matters.47 The second suggested test
is the doctrine of administrative finality, which determines the
conclusiveness of findings of the administrative body and the
range of issues open to review. This depends upon constitutional
39. (1938) 303 U. S. 41.
40. Note (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 766, 777.
41. The doctrine of negative orders is "the most definite and perhaps
the most questionable narrowing of the sphere of judicial interference after
preliminary resort of the Commission." 2 Sharfman, op. cit. supra, note 1,
at 406.
42. See supra, note 20.
43. (1939) 59 S. Ct. 754, 762.
44. See 2 Sharfman, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 393-406.
45. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907) 204 U. S. 426.
46. 2 Sharfman, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 397, 401.




issues, statutory authorization, and problems of proof and evi-
dence. These two doctrines need revision 8 and clarification in
some respects, but if carefully applied they will adequately
guard both the discretion and the expertness of the administra-
tive agencies and the traditional and proper functions of courts,
without aid from an arbitrary designation of certain orders asitnegative," and the formulation of distinctions based thereon.
CHARLoTTE ANSCHUETZ.
48. See Note (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 766, 772-778, where a number of the
problems are outlined.
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